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Biologics are becoming increasingly important for the potential
treatment of widespread diseases such as cancer, anemia, and
diabetes. As hundreds of biologics are going off-patent, the mar-
ket has become ripe for the introduction of generic biologics. A
regulatory pathway for biogenerics, however, is virtually non-
existent. The purpose of this paper is thus to analyze how a
successful legislative pathway for generic biologics might be de-
signed. The current regulatory scheme, economic concerns,
health and safety concerns, and the need to provide proper in-
centives for innovation are analyzed. Finally, recent
Congressional bills are outlined and critiqued, through which
the structure of a successful pathway for biogeneric approval
can be understood.
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INTRODUCTION
Biologics are an important part of America's health care system to-
day. They are used for the treatment of such serious or life-threatening
diseases as lung cancer, colorectal cancer, diabetes, and anemia.' So far,
over 150 new biologics have been approved by the FDA, which have
provided care for over 325 million patients.2 The FDA, however, has
long been reluctant to approve generic biologics. As early as 1974, the
FDA emphasized that every biologic must go through rigorous clinical
trials before approval because "all biological products are to some extent
different and thus must be separately proven safe, pure and effective....
There is no such thing as a 'me-too' biologic. 3 Such reluctance has be-
come more apparent today as hundreds of biologics are going off patent,
but only a handful of generic biologics have been approved. At the heart
of the FDA's reluctance to approve generic biologics is the inherent dif-
ficulty in determining whether generic biologics are as safe and effective
as their pioneer counterparts. As the FDA struggles to find safe and ef-
fective generic biologics, however, the average cost of critical biologics
continues to soar at a rate far surpassing that of traditional drugs. The
challenge is thus to find a way to get biogeneric products approved while
still maintaining the safety and efficacy standards set forth by the FDA.
This paper will explore the generic biologic market, the challenges asso-
ciated with the current regulatory framework, and how a successful
legislative pathway for generic biologics might be designed.
1. Backgrounder on Biologics, http://www.waxman.house.gov/pdfs/summary-
genericjbiologics_9.29.06.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
2. Id.
3. Wayne. H. Matelski, Generic Biologics: Outline of Legal and Regulatory Issues,
760 PRACTICING L. INST. PATS. COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARKS & LITERARY PROP COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES 291, 300 (2003) (quoting Preamble to FDA's Final Regulations Implementing
the Freedom of Information Act, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602 44,641 (Dec. 24, 1974)).
4. See David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues
Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 199 (2005).
5. See Backgrounder on Biologics, supra note 1.
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I. BIOLOGICS
Biologics are complex substances that are derived from living
sources. Defined under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), a biologi-
cal product is characterized as "a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin,
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic
product, or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of ar-
sphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound),
applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition
of human beings.' '6 Examples of biologics include insulin, some vac-
cines, and monoclonal antibodies, which can be useful for the treatment
of cancer, anemia, diabetes, hepatitis, and multiple sclerosis.' Biologics
are in contrast to traditional drugs, which are chemically synthesized.
Biologic product sales are continually increasing, with U.S. product
sales in 2005 jumping 17.2% to $32.8 billion and expected sales in 2006
to top $56 billion.8 Furthermore, global sales are forecast to reach $105
billion by 2010.9 Over the past ten years, the patents of more than a
dozen high-profit biologics have expired, resulting in over $11.5 billion
in combined annual sales of off-patent biologics.' ° Despite the patent
expirations, biologics manufacturers continue to enjoy an effective mo-
nopoly due to the lack of generics on the market.
The market is thus ready for the introduction of biogeneric products.
However, there are significantly greater barriers to market entry for ge-
neric biologics than for generic chemical entities, including both
enhanced marketing strategies to overcome consumer hesitation regard-
ing biologic materials and higher investment requirements. See Figure 1.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2004).
7. Alix Weisfeld, How Much Intellectual Property Protection Do the Newest (and
Coolest) Biotechnologies Get Internationally?, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 833, 834 (2006).
8. Gregory Roumeliotis, FDA Under Pressure to "Open the Floodgates" for
Biogenerics (2006), http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/news/ng.asp?n=69925-fda-biogenerics-
insulin-hgh-omnitrope; Weisfeld, supra note 7, at 834.
9. Mark Belsey et al., Biosimilars: Initial Excitement Gives Way to Reality, NATURE
REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY, July 2006, at 535.
10. Meredith Wadman, Copycats Gear up to Dog Biotech Brands, NATURE, Oct. 5,
2006, at 496.
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FIGURE I
BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BIOGENERICS"
- III
The most significant barrier to entry for geneic biologics is the current
regulatory scheme. As a result of their complex manufacturing process,
biological products vary significantly in complexity, size, and heteroge-
neity from chemically synthesized drugs.' Such complexity has made
finding a generic pathway for biologics under the current system diffi-
cult. Without an approval process for generic biologics, the costs and
barriers to market entry for generic biologics are essentially insurmount-
able.
IL. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Public Health Service Act vs. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The current regulatory scheme for biologics is not well-suited to
handle generic entry. Most biologics are not regulated as new drugs un-
der the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), but are instead licensed
under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and evalu-
ated by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).t>
Under the PHSA, a biologics license (BLA) must be obtained for all bio-
logics, which requires a showing that the product is safe and pure, and
that the facility for manufacturing is designed to assure such characteris-
tics.4 The PHSA does not currently contain a provision for generic
approval.
11. Belsey, supra note 9, at 536.
12. See vteaski, supra note 3, at 301.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2007).
14. Id
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Some biologics, however, such as insulin and human growth hor-
mone, are regulated as new drugs under the FDCA.'5 While there is no
clear explanation for why these biologics are regulated under the FDCA,
such delegation to the FDA does seem reasonable under the FDCA's
definition of a "drug," which includes "articles intended for use in the
,,16diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man.
This regulation of biologics under the FDCA suggests that the FDCA
provisions regarding generic entry of traditional drugs, called the Hatch-
Waxman provisions, could potentially be suitable for the regulation of
biologics.
B. Hatch- Waxman 505(j)
The first possible route for generic biologic approval under the
Hatch-Waxman Act is through section 505(j) of the FDCA, under which
a generic applicant is permitted to file an abbreviated new drug applica-
tion (ANDA). An ANDA will be accepted by the FDA without proof of
safety and efficacy if the generic manufacturer can show, among other
requirements, bioequivalence between the generic and pioneer drug.
7
Bioequivalence allows some variation in the route of administration,
strength, or dosage form, but always requires possession of the "same"
active ingredient.'8 The courts have generally left the determination of
"sameness" under section 5050) solely in the hands of the FDA, noting
that the FDA is entitled to a "high level of deference" for "evaluations of
scientific data within its area of expertise."' 9 While the FDA originally
interpreted "sameness" rather leniently,0 the term is now generally inter-
preted to require absolute chemical identity.2' Such equivalence is often
inapplicable to inherently complex and variable biological products. Fur-
thermore, the FDA appears to have foreclosed the applicability of
ANDAs to biologics approved under the PHSA when it stated that "an
abbreviated application will usually be reserved for duplicates of drug
15. Andrew Wasson, Taking Biologics for Granted? Takings, Trade Secrets, and Off-
Patent Biological Products, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0004, 1 9, http://www.law.duke.edu/
joumals/dtr/articles/2005dltr0004.html.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2004).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2004).
18. See id.
19. Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting A.L.
Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
20. See id. at 1318.
21. See Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, The Road to Follow on Biologics: Are We There
Yet?. 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 389, 395 (2004).
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products previously approved under a full application. 22 Thus, 505(j) has
been effectively eliminated as a means for generic biologics approval.
C. Hatch- Waxman 505(b)(2)
A more commonly used section of the Hatch-Waxman Act for get-
ting approval for generic biologics has been section 505(b)(2) of the
FDCA. The generic version of a small number of biologics, such as a
recombinant follitropin beta (Follistim®), recombinant human glucogon
(GlucaGen®), and human growth hormone (Omnitrope), have already
successfully gained approval through this section.23 Section 505(b)(2)
provides a sort of hybrid between a new drug application (NDA) and an
ANDA, whereby applicants may rely on the investigations conducted by
a third party, including the pioneer manufacturer, to show the safety and
efficacy of their own products.2" While the applicant is required to prove
the "relevance and applicability" of any previous clinical findings, he is
not required to perform many of the trials himself and, thus, avoids much
of the cost associated with obtaining FDA approval of a new drug. Fur-
thermore, the statutory language of 505(b)(2) nowhere requires
bioequivalence, though the products must be similar enough that the
safety and efficacy standards can be legally and scientifically applicable
to a new drug.25 This section is therefore, perhaps, a more likely regula-
tory pathway for getting biogenerics to the market because it allows
more leeway for the natural variation of biological products.
Such an approach seemed promising in Berlex Laboratories, Inc. v.
FDA, where the District Court of D.C. confirmed that biological prod-
ucts could be legally approved under section 505(b)(2).26 The court in
Berlex upheld the FDA's approval of Avonex, a "generic" of Berlex's
interferon beta-la product. The FDA's approval was based upon evi-
dence of comparability between the two products that included
physicochemical comparability, similarity of vivo activities, and equiva-
lent pharmacokinetics in humans.27 The FDA's decision regarding
Avonex, and the district court's approval of it, was of particular impor-
tance because it marked the first time that the FDA had found two
different cell lines to be similar. However, this decision essentially marks
the first and only time that the FDA has taken such a position. Since
22. Dudzinski, supra note 4, at 197 (citing New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50
Fed. Reg. 7452, 7466, 7497 (Feb 22, 1985) (codified at Abbreviated Application, 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.55)).
23. Id. at 199.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2004).
25. Dudzinski, supra note 4, at 214.
26. 942 F Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1996).
27. Id. at 22.
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then, the FDA has steadfastly refused to approve generic versions of
complex biologic products under section 505(b)(2)."
Aside from the FDA's hesitancy to approve complex biologics under
505(b)(2), use of this regulatory pathway poses another problem for ge-
neric biologics: use of the provision would require that biologics either
be approved as "new drugs" under the FDCA or that the Hatch-Waxman
provisions extend to biologics approved under the PHSA. Most biolog-
ics, however, are approved under the PHSA. And while an extension of
the Hatch-Waxman to the PHSA does not seem contradictory to statutory
language, as section 2620) of the PHSA emphasizes that the FDCA still
applies to biological products that are also regulated under the PHSA,29
the FDA has so far refused to take such a view. As the agency recently
emphasized, "there is no abbreviated approval pathway ... for produce
products licensed under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act.
30
Section 505(b)(2) is consequently an unlikely pathway for generic ap-
proval of biologics.
III. LEGISLATION
A. Need for New Legislation
A recent decision by the District Court of D.C. in Sandoz Inc. v.
Leavitt had many generic manufacturers believing that there was soon to
be a pathway for getting generic biologics through the approval proc-
ess." By ordering the FDA to respond to Sandoz's application for
approval of Omnitrope, a generic biologic used to treat growth disorders,
the court attempted to force the FDA to deal with the growing confusion
surrounding approval of generic biologics. However, while the FDA ap-
proved Omnitrope, it has aggressively appealed the district court's
decision to the Federal Circuit.32 Furthermore, in granting its approval,
the agency asserted that it was approving Omnitrope not as a generic
biologic, but as a relatively simple "follow-on protein product."33 The
FDA emphasized that the approval did "not establish a pathway for ap-
proval of follow-on products for biological products.., nor does it mean
that more complex and/or less well understood proteins approved as
28. See Omnitrope Questions and Answers, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/
somatropin/qa.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2620) (2003).
30. Omnitrope Questions and Answers, supra note 28.
31. 427 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2006).
32. Id., appeal filed, No. 1:05CV01810, available at www.orangebookblog.com/files/
Omnitrope.pdf.
33. Omnitrope Questions and Answers, supra note 28.
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drugs under the [FDCA] could be approved as follow-on products."'' Its
warning was reaffirmed in July, 2006 when the agency refused to ap-
prove an ANDA for Nastech's generic version of Miacalcin, a protein-
based nasal- spray."
As the leader of one interest group notes, "[i]t has become clear that.
the FDA will not act on its own to create ... an abbreviated pathway for
all biologic medicines, so it is essential that Congress provide legislative
direction. 3 6 Duplicate non-clinical and clinical testing for similar prod-
ucts is both inefficient and unethical, and the lack of potential generic
competition stifles innovation in the biologics industry. Furthermore, the
failure to find an abbreviated process for generic biologics has limited
generic market entry and led to prohibitively high prices for vital medi-
cal products. Taken together, these factors warrant new Congressional
legislation. In designing such a statute, however, Congress will have to
be mindful of the delicate balance between economic concerns, health
and safety concerns, and the creation of proper incentives for innovation.
B. Economic Concerns
As Representative Henry Waxman stated in September 2006,
"[u]nder our current law, biologic products are effectively given a near-
complete monopoly .... The time has come to break this monopoly.
Congress can no longer stand by and watch as our reliance on biologics
increases, and the cost of these medicines continues to soar."37 Because
biologics are not faced with generic competition, manufacturers are able
to charge up to $100,000 annually per patient for their products. In fact,
in 2005, the cost of biologics increased by 17.5%, compared to 10% for
traditional drugs.39 These prices have severely inflated health care costs,
as evidenced by the fact that the five largest Medicare Part B drug ex-
penditures are all for biologics (including Epogen, Aranesp, Procrit,
Remicade, and Neulasta).40
Economists have argued that pharmaceutical monopolistic practices
create deadweight loss to society that range from $3 billion to $5 billion
34. Id.
35. Roumeliotis, supra note 8.
36. Letter from Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Fed'n of Am., to Henry
A. Waxman, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 28, 2006) (available at http:/
www.waxman.house.gov/pdfs/ lettersconsumer federation.biologics_9.28.06.pdf).
37. Wadman, supra note 10, at 496.
38. See Kathleen Jaeger, FDA Needs to support Generic Biologics PHARMACY TIMES,
June 2006, at 40, available at http://www.pharmacytimes.com/Article.cfm?Menu=l&
ID=3584.
39. Backgrounder on Biologics, supra note 1, at 2.
40. Id. at 1.
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dollars." Generic substitution can, however, protect society from some of
this deadweight. Fifty-six percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the
United States are generics, but they account for only 13% of health care
expenditures. 2 A study by the Congressional Budget Office estimated
that the net benefit of savings from generic substitution of prescription
drugs per year can range between $8 billion to $10 billion dollars. 3
Thus, if generic biologics have the same effect on healthcare as tradi-
tional pharmaceutical generics, the introduction of generic biologics
could save the country billions of dollars.
Some economists, however, have challenged the notion that access
to biogenerics will cut prices for consumers. Although generics generally
become available for about one-twentieth of the regular price," the cost
of producing and testing biogenerics is likely to be much higher than for
traditional drugs. The cost associated with getting a biogeneric to market
could be tens of millions of dollars, as compared to a couple of million
dollars for traditional generics. 5 In addition to the higher cost associated
with biogeneric development, biologics tend to have smaller target mar-
kets for which incentives to entry may not be as high, and they tend to be
used to treat life-threatening diseases, for which managed care organiza-
46tions are often less likely to utilize price control measures. As a result,
some economists argue that very few biogeneric companies are likely to
emerge, making price drops for consumers unlikely in the near future. 7
Such concerns, however, may be misplaced. The European Union, which
already has a system in place for biogeneric approval, estimates that it
will save $2.8 billion from the market entry of only a few products.
Similarly, Australia, which also has a fast-track mechanism in place for
generic biologics, has been successful in decreasing the cost of human
growth hormone by 25%." Therefore, the economic savings on bio-
generics displayed in the EU and Australia certainly seem to favor
development of a regulatory pathway for generic biologics.
41. Joshua W. Devine et al., Follow-on Biologics: Competition in the Biopharmaceuti-
cal Marketplace, 46 J. AM. PHARMACISTS Assoc. 193, 199 (2006).
42. Kathleen Jaeger, President/CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass'n, Windhover FDA/CMS
Summit (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Media&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=3048.
43. Backgrounder on Biologics, supra note 1, at 3.
44. Wadman, supra note 10, at 497.
45. Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will it Evolve?,
25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1291, 1293 (2006).
46. Id. at 1294-95.
47. Id.
48. Jaeger, supra note 42.
49. Id.
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C. Health and Safely Concerns
Because the economic stakes in the biologics industry are so high, it
can be difficult to tell which of the health and safety concerns raised by
the various industries are valid. Nonetheless, health and safety concerns
are particularly significant for biogenerics as a result of the inherent dif-
ference between biologics and traditional drugs. When two chemically-
synthesized drugs are proven bioequivalent, their safety and efficacy can
be assumed because two identical drugs will consistently produce the
same reactions. However, biologics do not have such characteristics.
Rather, all biologics possess the potential for immunogenicity, ° which
can cause both serious side-effects and a loss in efficacy.' Even small
and undetectable changes can cause significant immune reactions. Slight
changes in sequence, glycosylation, process-related impurities, formula-
tion, and storage and handling can all increase immunogenicity1
2
Because reference biologics will generally have manufacturing processes
that are protected by trade secrets, comparable biologics manufacturers
will naturally have a different manufacturing process, which could lead
to small but significant variations in the safety and efficacy of the final
product. 3 Therefore, the ability to properly characterize biologics is
critical in determining comparability.
Relatively small molecules can be characterized fairly easily through
the use of mass spectrometry, infrared spectrometry, nuclear magnetic
resonance, x-ray crystallography, and other physical methods. 4 How-
ever, larger biologic molecules can be much more difficult to
characterize in detail because they are more variable and complex when
they contain active macromolecules." Analytical tests such as chemical
and physical assays can be a starting point for determining the structure,
identity, purity, and stability of more complex biologics. While such
methods may not always be capable of identifying the functional charac-
teristics of biological products, bioassays may help identify specific
functional attributes 6 Unfortunately, even the relation between the struc-
ture and function of biologics in many instances may not clearly relate to
50. See Matelski, supra note 3, at 301.
51. Christian Combe et al., Biosimilar Epoetins: An Analysis Based on Recently Imple-
mented European Medicines Evaluation Agency Guidelines on Comparability of
Biopharmaceutical Proteins, 25 PHARMACOTHERAPY 954, 955 (2005); Matelski, supra note 3,
at 301.
52. Combe et al., supra note 51, at 955.
53. See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 21, at 398.
54. Arman H. Nadershahi & Joseph M. Reisman, Generic Biotech Products: Provisions
in Patent and Drug Development Law, BIOPROCESS INT'L, Oct. 2003, at 26, 27.
55. Id. at 27-28.
56. Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 21, at 399.
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the safety and efficacy of the product.57 Accordingly, the ability to clearly
predict the immunogenicity of a biologic entirely through non-clinical
means does not exist.
Clinical trials remain the best markers of biologic immunogenicity.
However, clinical trials can be extremely expensive. Furthermore, even
clinical trials may not be effective in understanding all safety and effi-
cacy concerns, particularly because immune responses to biologics can
vary from product to product. Given the uncertainty surrounding the
health and safety of biogenerics, any new legislation should give the
FDA considerable discretion to establish the scientific criteria necessary
to define biosimilarity, and hence, health and safety of a biologic, on a
case-by-case basis.
D. Hatch- Waxman Lessons
The mechanisms of the Hatch-Waxman Act have been carefully
crafted to balance the need for lower-priced and safe drugs with proper
incentives for innovation and development. Aside from the similarity and
bioequivalence provisions that affect health and safety concerns regard-
ing generics, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides several provisions that are
meant to protect or incentivize either the pioneer or the generic manufac-
turer. Such provisions are an important consideration in developing a
regulatory pathway for generic biologics.
1. New Chemical Entity Exclusivity
The Hatch-Waxman Act gives a five-year data exclusivity period for
new chemical entities.8 Under the provisions for new chemical entity
exclusivity, a generic manufacturer is prohibited from filing an ANDA
for five years after the innovator's approval. This prohibition, however, is
reduced to four years if the generic manufacturer files a paragraph IV
certification stating either that the generic does not infringe a patent or
that the innovator patent is invalid. 9 This provision of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was meant to alleviate concerns that a generic pathway would prohibit
innovators from realizing the benefits of their investments. Between this
new chemical exclusivity and the patent term extensions granted under the
Patent Act (which are already applicable to biologics), 60 the Hatch-
Waxman Act appears to have been successful in at least keeping innova-
tors' incentive to invest stable, as brand name pharmaceutical sales and
57. Id.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2000).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2) (2004).
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revenues continued to multiply following the enactment of the legisla-
tion.
The inherent differences between biologics and traditional drugs
may counsel towards even greater exclusivity protection for innovator
biologic drugs than for traditional drugs. Biologics cost more to produce
than traditional drugs, and thus a five-year market exclusivity similar to
the Hatch-Waxman provision may not be long enough to incentivize the
development of biologics. Furthermore, while traditional new drugs are
generally protected by patents, biologics may be less effectively pro-
tected by the patent system. The complexity of most biologics may allow
a biogeneric manufacturer to design around an innovator's patents, but
still secure regulatory approval through its "biosimilarity" to the pioneer
biologic.62 Furthermore, the patentability of some biological materials is
extremely narrow due to stringent specification and enablement require-
ments. 6' As such, new legislation needs to appropriately protect the
innovator investment in biologic products. Some have suggested that a
12-year market exclusivity for pioneer biologics would be optimal be-
cause traditional drugs generally have slightly under 12 years of market
exclusivity due to patent protection.64 Others, of course, would suggest
that such an "extension" would be excessive and that the 5-year exclu-
sivity granted to traditional drugs would be more than enough to
encourage development in the profitable biologics market. Regardless,
new legislation for biogenerics should certainly include some form of
new entity exclusivity.
2. 30-Month Stay
Under Hatch-Waxman provisions, if an infringement action is
brought against a generic manufacturer, the FDA is required to stay ap-
proval of a generic product for thirty months or until a court decision,
whichever is shorter.65 This provision is meant to provide the innovator
with an opportunity to protect its patent rights before the FDA permits
generic entry. This provision has been highly criticized, however, be-
cause it has arguably led to frivolous patent suits as innovators attempt to
keep generic competitors off of the market. A study by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) demonstrated that such arguments may be well-
founded, as 73% of the court cases analyzed resulted in decisions for the
61. Devine, supra note 41, at 197.
62. Bruce S. Manheim Jr. et al., "Follow-On Biologics": Ensuring Continued Innova-
tion in The Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 394, 398 (2006).
63. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Genentech v. Novo Nord-
isk A/S, 108 F3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
64. Manheim et al., supra note 62, at 401.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
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generic drug companies.66 Most of the concern regarding the 30-month
stay, however, has been alleviated by recent amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which restrict innovators to only one use of the 30-month
stay.67 As the FTC has noted, one 30-month stay is unlikely to signifi-
cantly delay generic entry because it historically has accurately
approximated the time necessary for the FDA to review and approve an
ANDA.68
Unfortunately, the stay provision of any new biologics legislation
could be prone to more abuse than seen under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Because patents covering biologics may be narrower than for traditional
drugs, and because the FDA will certainly continue its hands-off ap-
proach to monitoring patent listings, the potential exists for biologic
innovators to bring more frivolous suits based upon weakly-related pat-
ents. As one 30-month stay is unlikely to delay generic entry, however,
legislation providing a pathway for approval of generic biologics should
probably include a stay provision. Without such a provision, the strength
and enforceability of patent rights may be hindered, and incentive for
biologics innovation may be significantly reduced.
3. 180-Day Generic Exclusivity
The Hatch-Waxman Act also gives generic exclusivity to the first
generic to get approval of an ANDA through use of a Paragraph IV certi-
fication.69 The purpose of this exclusivity was to provide an incentive for
generic companies to challenge listed patents. The 180-day exclusivity,
however, has also been criticized. The biggest concern has traditionally
been that generic and pioneer companies are able to take advantage of
the 180-day exclusivity by entering into agreements to settle pending
patent infringement litigation. If the 180-day provision never began, as
the statute was previously interpreted, then it could never end, thereby
prohibiting any additional generic manufacturers from entering the mar-
ket. Recent amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act alleviate some of these
concerns by mandating forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity if certain
"forfeiture events" occur, such as the first applicant failing to market the
drug or the FTC winning a suit against the parties for antitrust violations.7°
66. Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An
FTC Study, 13 (July 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
67. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-57 (2003) (amending Fed. Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000));.see also Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note
66, at 39.
68. Federal Trade Comm'n, supra note 66, at 39, 47.
69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii) (2000).
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Even with the 180-day exclusivity forfeiture provision, some settlements
are still being questioned under anti-trust law, though such issues are
outside the scope of this paper. One further concern with the 180-day
generic exclusivity has been whether the innovator can bring its own ge-
neric, called an authorized generic, to the market during the 180-day
exclusivity period. However, because the legislative intent in allowing
generic approval pathways is to lower consumer costs, such concerns
seem unlikely to prevail.
A successful pathway for generic biologics approval will thus likely
have a 180-day generic exclusivity provision for those biogenerics that
challenge an innovator's patents, provided that it includes forfeiture
events similar to those outlined in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
E. European Approach
Lessons might also be learned from the European Union on how to
develop a generic pathway for biologics. In 2005, the EU approved a
regulatory path for the approval of biosimilars.7' The European Medi-
cines Agency, Europe's equivalent of the FDA, has approved the first
four drugs this year, including a generic version of human growth hor-
mone. Almost half (44%) of pharmaceutical industry executives believe
that the United States should follow the EU approach. 73 The European
guidelines, similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, establish two routes for
submission of an abridged marketing application for biogenerics, includ-
ing a route for identical products and a route for "biosimilar" products.
Biosimilarity under the EU guidelines can only be found by establishing
comparability of quality, safety, and efficacy of the biologics.74 Determi-
nants for finding product comparability include the nature of the product,
quality of the findings, dosage regimen, route of administration, thera-
peutic window identified in dose-ranging studies, mechanism of action,
previous experience with immunogenic activity, extent of knowledge of
structure-activity relationships, and short- vs. long-term use.75 The guide-
lines therefore generally give the European Medicines Agency wide
discretion in determining the similarity and safety of biogenerics on a
case-by-case basis. In addition to these measures, Europe has recently
71. Wadman, supra note 10, at 496.
72. Progress of Biologics Slow in the United States, DRUG STORE NEWS (August 13,
2007), available at http://findarticles.comp/articles/ni_m3374/is-1029/ai_n19492799.
73. Liebert, Ann. Should U.S. Approve Follow-On Biologics?, BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW
REPORT 389, 389 (August 2006).
74. EUROPEAN MEDICINES EVALUATION AGENCY COMMITTEE FOR PROPRIETARY ME-
DICINAL PRODUCTS (EMEA), Guideline on Comparability of Medicinal Products Containing
Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substances (2003), http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/
human/ewp/309702en.pdf.
75. Id.
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instituted a 10-year market exclusivity period for all pharmaceuticals,
including biologics, in order to allow the innovator to reap the benefits of
its research.76
IV. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL BILLS
A. Bill Summaries
Several bills have been introduced into Congress this year, includ-
ing H.R. 1038, H.R. 1956, and S. 1695, in an attempt to find a generic
pathway for biologics. The flurry of activity has many generic biologic
manufacturers hoping that a regulatory pathway may be in sight,
though similar proposed legislation has historically stalled.77
All three of the current bills amend section 351 of the PHSA to es-
tablish a process for approval of an abbreviated biological product
application for products that contain the same or similar active ingredi-
ents as previously licensed biological products. Under one of the
proposed bills, an applicant must prove through necessary non-clinical
(chemical, physical, and biological assays) and clinical studies "the
absence of clinically meaningful differences between the biological
product and the reference product in terms of safety, purity, and po-
tency."79 Though not as explicitly, the other bills likewise address the
safety, purity, and potency of the biosimilar 0 In order to meet such
standards, the applicant must always demonstrate that the product is
"biosimilar" to the reference product. The current bills vary on how
such similarity must be shown, though they generally require "similar-
ity" of active products, identical routes of administration, dosage, and
strength, and the same mechanism of action for the same condition of
use. See Table 1 for a comparison of the similarity provisions of the
current bills.
76. Grabowski, supra note 45, at 1300.
77. Paul Elias, Generic Drug Proponents Call FDA Ruling "First Step" to Cheaper
Biotech Drugs, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 31, 2006.
78. H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1956, 110th Cong. (2007); S.1695, 110th
Cong. (2007).
79. H.R. 1038.
80. H.R. 1956; S. 1695.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SIMILARITY REQUIREMENTS IN CURRENT
CONGRESSIONAL BILL PROVISIONS
HR 1038 HR 1956 S 1695
Access to Life-Saving Patent Protection and Biologics Price Competition
Medicine Act Innovative Biologic Innovation Act
Medicines Act
Introduced Feb. 14, 2007 Introduced April 19, 2007 Introduced June 26, 2007 as a
by Henry Waxrman (D-CA) by Jay Inslee (D-WA) bipartisan effort led
by Ted Kennedy (D-MA)
and Orin Hatch (R-UT)
Biosimilar and reference must Biosimilar and reference must Biosimilar and reference must be
contain highly similar principal be comparable at both the highly similar.
molecular structural features, active and finished product
notwithstanding minor levels.
differences in heterogeneity
profile, impurities, or degradation
patterns.
Biosimilar and reference route of N/A Biosimilar and reference route of
administration, dosage form, and administration, dosage form, and
strength must be the same. strength must be the same.
Biosimilar and reference must Biosimilar and reference must Biosimilar and reference must
have the same mechanism of show comparative results of utilize the same mechanism of
action for the same condition of pharmacokintecs, action for the same condition of
use. pharmacodynamics, toxicity, use.
and immunogeneity,
comparative safety, purity, and
potency profiles for the same
condition of use.
Moreover, all of the bills have provisions to account for the com-
plexity of biological products. One bill prohibits the FDA from refusing
to find two products comparable when they: (1) differ in structure due
solely to post-translational events, infidelity of translation or transcrip-
tion, or minor differences in amino acid sequence; (2) have "similar
saccharide repeating units, even if the number of units differ and even if
there are differences in post-polymerization modifications"; (3) are gly-
cosylated and have characteristics of the above; (4) have identical
sequences of polynucleotides; (5) are "closely related, complex partly
definable biological products with similar therapeutic intent, such as two
live viral products for the same indication.' Yet another bill requires the
81. H.R. 1038.
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products to be "highly similar," with the standards for similarity left en-
tirely up to the discretion of the FDA.82
The bills likewise vary in their exclusivity provisions, ranging from
zero to 14 years of innovator exclusivity and zero to one year of generic
exclusivity. 3 Furthermore, only two of the three allow the generic pro-
ducer to establish interchangeability with the reference product. '
B. Proposed Improvements to Bills
In light of the various failures and successes of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and the guidance provided by the European guidelines, there are
specific areas of all of the current Congressional bills that may need im-
provement. See Table 2 for a comparison of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
the current bills.
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF HATCH-WAXMAN AND CURRENT
CONGRESSIONAL BILL PROVISIONS
Hatch-Waxman HR 1038 HR 1956 S 1695
Act Access to Life-Saving Patient Protection Biologic Price
Medicine Act and Innovative Competition
Biologic Medicines Innovation Act
Act
Requires Requires biosimilarity & Requires biosimilarity Requires biosimilarity &
bioequivalence. limits FDA discretion. & creates committee gives FDA discretion.
to set standards.
5-year new chemical N/A 14-year innovator 12-year innovator
entity exclusivity for exclusivity, exclusivity.
innovator.
30-month stay of N/A N/A No stay, but the
generic approval if innovator may seek a
patient litigation suit is preliminary injunction to
filed. prohibit generic from
manufacturing the
product.
1 80-day generic At least 180 days of N/A At least one year of
exclusivity for generic generic exclusivity for generic exclusivity for
approval under interchangeable products. interchangeable
Paragraph IV. I products.
S. 1695.
H.R. 1038; H.R. 1956; S.1695.
Fall 2007]
262 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:245
Hatch-Waxman HR 1038 HR 1956 S 1695
Act Access to Life-Saving Patient Protection and Biologic Price
Medicine Act Innovative Biologic Competition
Medicines Act Innovation Act
Patents must be Generic may request list N/A Reference applicant
listed in the of patents, and the holder must provide a list of
Orange Book. of the approved reference patents for which an
must provide the infringement claim
information with 60 days, could be made within
but may demand up to 60 days of receiving
$1,000 to cover the costs. the generic
application.
Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, both H.R. 1956 and S. 1695 grant wide
discretion to the FDA to determine similarity standards. However, H.R.
1038 limits such discretion. Due to the inherent difficulty in determining
the safety and effectiveness of biologics, a generic pathway might be
best structured to grant the FDA wide discretion to determine whether
products are comparable, but requiring, as the EU guidelines do, that the
FDA consider the nature of the product, quality of the findings, dosage
regimen, route of administration, therapeutic window identified in dose-
ranging studies, mechanism of action, previous experience with immu-
nogenic activity, extent of knowledge of structure-activity relationships,
and the expected extent of use.
An ideal bill should adequately provide incentives for pioneer bio-
logics manufacturers. Whereas the Hatch-Waxman Act grants five years
of innovator exclusivity and the EU gives a 10-year period of exclusivity,
H.R. 1038 provides no innovator exclusivity. In contrast, both H.R. 1956
and S. 1695 grant periods of exclusivity over 12 years, with the potential
to renew such exclusivity for even minor changes under S. 1695.85 Given
the increased cost associated with biologics and the potential lack of pat-
ent protection for such products, a generics pathway should include at
least a 5-year exclusivity period in order to protect innovator investments
and provide incentive for innovation. However, a period of much more
than 10 years has the potential to make generic manufacturers shy away.
Innovators are limited in their ability to protect their investments un-
der all of the current bills because there is no 30-month stay granted
during infringement suits. As one 30-month stay is unlikely to signifi-
cantly delay market entry, and patent protection is fundamental to
innovation, the ideal Congressional bill should include such a provision.
Finally, the ideal bill should adequately compensate generic manu-
facturers by providing at least some exclusivity for biologic products.
85. Progress of Biologics Slow in the United States, supra note 72.
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However, whereas the Hatch-Waxman Act gives exclusivity only to
those products against which infringement actions have been filed, H.R.
1038 and S. 1695 both grant exclusivity to interchangeable manufactur-
ers regardless of whether an innovator brings an infringement suit. While
such an expansive grant of exclusivity is not inherently unreasonable and
might encourage generic biologics manufacturers to pursue interchange-
ability, it may be unnecessary, particularly given the economic incentives
for pursuing generics that are already in place. In contrast, H.R. 1956
fails to provide any generic exclusivity, which is also seemingly prob-
lematic.
Thus, all of the current Congressional bills have their drawbacks.
H.R. 1038 grants little discretion to the FDA to find products unsimilar
and fails to give either innovator exclusivity or a stay, thereby signifi-
cantly favoring generics manufacturers. In contrast, H.R. 1956 grants an
extensive period of innovator exclusivity and fails to give any generic
exclusivity, thereby favoring the brand-name biologics manufacturers.
And finally, S. 1695, though seemingly more neutral, may grant too
much innovator exclusivity, particularly if the language is read to grant
additional exclusivity for minor changes to the product. As a result of
these challenges, none of the current bills is likely to pass. In fact, the
chances that any legislation will pass through this Congress are "ex-
tremely thin," according to Representative Waxman himself.86 However,
despite the bills' shortcomings and the unlikely chances of passage, the
introduction and consideration of a biogenerics bill in any form signifies
a promising future for generic biologic products.
CONCLUSION
Because there is currently no approval mechanism for generic bio-
logics, it is important that Congress develop new legislation to establish
such a pathway. Whatever new pathway is chosen, and whatever bill
Congress ultimately passes, it must somehow weigh the costs and bene-
fits of safety concerns and innovation with lower costs and expanded
access. Judging from the differences between biologics and traditional
drugs and the provisions of both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the EU
guidelines, an ideal generic biologics bill would likely provide the FDA
with the discretion to determine similarity of products on a case-by-case
basis so that health and safety concerns can be accurately met. More-
over, the new legislation should include a new entity exclusivity period
of five years or more, a 30-month stay, and a 180-day exclusivity for
86. Ed Silverman. Generic Biologics Bill Unlikely to Pass, PHARMALOT, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://www.pharmalot.coml2007/09/generic-biologics-bill-unlikely-to-pass/.
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those biogenerics that challenge an innovator's patent. While the current
Congressional bills are a step in the right direction, they may fail to
properly balance the needs of brand-name manufacturers with those of
the consuming public. Therefore, Congress must continue to consider
the economic, health and safety, and innovation concerns in order to suc-
cessfully develop a regulatory pathway that will bring much-needed
generic biologics to the market.
